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NOTES
THE PENAL INCARCERATION OF THE
INCORRIGIBLE JUVENILE
I. Introduction
Until a century ago our system of criminal justice did not differentiate be-
tween the adult and the minor who had reached the age of criminal responsi-
bility. The state demanded vindication for infractions of the law from both alike
with the focus not on reformation but on punishment of the offender. The juve-
nile convicted of committing criminal acts was to be treated as that which he
was, a criminal.'
Eventually states began to enlighten their attitude toward the juvenile of-
fender. Legislation established juvenile courts as special tribunals to carry a
more humanitarian concept into effect.2 Under such legislation, states no longer
would act as the prosecutor of a crime but as legal guardian and protector of
the delinquent child.' This transition in attitude has presented a serious ques-
tion: may the state in brandishing this philanthropic banner continue to au-
thorize the commitment of juvenile offenders to institutions primarily designed
for the adult criminal offender?
Juvenile courts have generally refrained from commitments to adult penal
institutions. In most instances the court may order probation or placement at
an institution specifically designed for the care and education of the juvenile.
Nevertheless, many states directly or indirectly authorize the penal incarceration
of the juvenile, and juvenile courts have at times exercised such authority.
Hence, the constitutional validity of such penal commitment under the unique
procedures of the juvenile court demands scrutiny.
Legislation authorizing penal commitment of the juvenile has been moti-
vated primarily by the need to remove problem children from the juvenile facil-
ities where their presence might prove harmful to other juveniles." It is con-
tended that this ill-suited juvenile must be placed at an institution more capable
of handling his extreme incorrigibility. The protection of society demands that
control and the maintenance of order be the primary consideration.
Those opposing penal commitment argue that while placement at a more
secure penal institution is indeed a practical manipulation of certain benefit,
such practicality fails to withstand the constitutional challenges of the juvenile's
right to due process. A penally incarcerated adult has been convicted in a
criminal proceeding with its attendant procedural protections. The juvenile
hearing, however, lacks much of the formality of the criminal proceeding along
1 See Mack, The Juuenile Court, 23 IAv. L. R.v. 104 (1909). This article is a classic
in the field of juvenile law. Judge Mack provides an excellent insight into the objectives hoped
to be realized in light of past frustrations in the treatment of juvenile offenders.
2 The first juvenile court system was legislatively created by Illinois in 1899, with the first
juvenile court being established in Cook County, Illinois.
3 The states uniformly agreed upon the purpose of the juvenile court, with this or
similar language being used in just about all the cases sustaining juvenile court legislation.
4 Shone v. State, 237 A.2d 412, 415 (Me. 1968). Pirsig, The Constitutional Validity of
Confining Disruptive Delinquents in Penal Institutions, 54 MINN. L. REv. 101, 124-25 (1969).
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with many of its procedural safeguards. To treat the offender as a juvenile for
purposes of the judicial hearing and to then sentence the offender as an adult
is arguably a violation of the juvenile's right to judicial fair treatment.5
II. General Framework of the Juvenile Court
The accepted purpose of juvenile court legislation is to insure the protection,
education, and reformation of juvenile offenders. States have recognized the
imperative duty of every enlightened government to secure the well-being of
her ungovernable youth and have traced the basis of this sovereign power of
guardianship to the sweeping concept of parens patriae2
The historical origin of the parens patriae concept is clouded. It has been
conjectured that the concept derives from an ancient prerogative of the English
kings. The king as protector of all children within his realm had the duty to
defend all persons who because of their minority were unable to fend for them-
selves. It is further conjectured that the Court of Chancery thereafter inherited
this executive duty in its role of Keeper of the Great Seal.' Eventually, this power
did in fact become firmly established as a judicial function of the English
Chancery Court.'
In the United States the adopted power of parens patriae belongs exclusively
to the legislature and is possessed by the judiciary only to the extent conferred
by statute.9 Under the doctrine the state is authorized to legislate for the protec-
tion, care, and maintenance of the children within its borders.'"
State intrusion upon the natural authority of the parents will occur only
upon default of the parents in their duty toward their dependant." The right
of the parents to possess and to control their child is not inalienable, and where
the state in its parental role finds that official intervention is demanded as the
best means of securing the juvenile's present and future well-being, it is authorized
under the parens patriae concept to interfere." Logical or not, a juvenile's
involvement in a criminal offense is usually strong evidence that parents have
been delinquent in their duty and that state intrusion is required.
In its parental role the state has statutorily initiated unique juvenile offender
proceedings that are philosophically as well as procedurally distinct from criminal
proceedings. The juvenile hearing is formally designated as a noncriminal
determination of status. 3 Major technicalities and formalities are done away
5 White v. Reid, 125 F. Supp. 647, 650 '(D.D.G. 1954).
6 Mack, supra note 1, at 108-109. With the emphasis not on punishment for an act but
on learning why the juvenile acted in this way and to gauge treatment accordingly, the court
will naturally possess a greater degree of discretion under the parens patriae doctrine than
under the orientation of the criminal court.
7 4 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1304 (5th ed. 1941). In actuality, the King
did not act as defender of all children, but as guardian of only a select few. This parental
power was exercised by the king only in regard to heirs who lacked the capacity to manage
their own affairs and in regard to children as an incident of direct feudal tenure.
8 Id.
9 Id. at § 1340 n.14.
10 White v. Reid, 125 F. Supp. 647, 649 (D.D.G. 1954); State v. Gronna, 79 N.D. 673,
703. 59 N.W.2d 514, 539 '(1953).
11 Ex parte Grouse, 4 Whart. 9 (1838).
12 Id.
13 Kautter v. Reid, 183 F. Supp. 352, 353 (D.D.C. 1960); White v. Reid, 125 F. Supp.
647, 649 (D.D.C. 1954).
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with in the judicial attempt to better focus on the infirmity of the youth and to
best prescribe the necessary treatment.' Theoretically, therefore, a juvenile
comes before the court not as a suspected criminal but as a youth who is possibly
in need of proper parental care and guidance.
The unique orientation and substitution of much of the criminal procedure
do not exempt the state from the requirement of judicial fair treatment of
the juvenile offender. It has been ordered on various occasions by the United
States Supreme Court that such proceedings must meet the due process require-
ment of fundamental fairness. 5
The inquiry into the fairness of the proceeding is important despite the
noncriminal label since in the majority of instances the hearing centers on
whether or not the juvenile requires some form of official supervision and deten-
tion. While a determination of delinquency will theoretically only render the
juvenile susceptible to the imposition of protection and guidance by the state,
the juvenile has the right to decline to surrender any aspect of his liberty and
to continue his life without judicial interference until such time as the state can
justify an infringement of that liberty.
To what extent does the requirement of fundamental fairness undercut the
theoretical basis of the juvenile court and make it essentially synonymous with
the criminal trial? It has been held by the Supreme Court that the criterion
of fundamental fairness necessitates the incorporation of certain criminal proce-
dural safeguards. In re Gault" established minimal standards that must be
met to comply with the juvenile's due process rights: (1) Notice of the scheduled
proceeding must be given sufficiently in advance in order that a "reasonable
opportunity to prepare will be afforded" and the notice "must set forth tlie
alleged misconduct with particularity."'" (2) The juvenile must be afforded
the right to have counsel represent him.'8 (3) The juvenile must be afforded
the privilege against self-incrimination. 9 (4) A determination of delinquency
cannot be sustained in the absence of "sworn testimony subjected to the oppor-
tunity for cross-examination.... .""
Gault specifically did not hold that fundamental fairness grants the juvenile
the right to insist upon appellate review, to have a transcript or recording of
the hearing, or to have the judge specifically state the grounds upon which his
conclusion is based.2 ' The Supreme Court later decided that a juvenile has no
absolute right to trial by jury.22 Furthermore, it has never been uniformly held
that a juvenile has a right to a speedy" or public trial,' to be placed only once
14 United States ex rel. Murray v. Owens, 341 F. Supp. 722, 724 (S.D. N.Y. 1972);
White v. Reid, 125 F. Supp. 647, 649 (D.D.O. 1954); In re Dargo, 81 Cal. App. 2d 205,
208, 183 P.2d 282, 284 (1947).
15 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 '(1971); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 12
(1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 54-1, 562 (1966); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601
(1948).
16 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
17 Id. at 33.
18 Id. at 41.
19 Id. at 55.
20 Id. at 57.
21 Id. at 58.
22 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
23 McCloskey v. Director of Patuxent Institution, 230 Md. 635, 187 A.2d 833 (1963),
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in jeopardy,2 5 or to presentment only by indictment or information.O Although
it is an uncontested requisite that evidence to establish delinquency must be
sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt,2 7 the extent to which the generally accepted
rules of evidence are applied in juvenile court varies greatly among the states.
2 8
While it is apparent that not all of the criminal procedural safeguards have
been incorporated within the juvenile offender proceedings, it is equally apparent
that to a substantial degree the juvenile hearing has taken on the tenor of an
adversary proceeding. Is such a proceeding in all practicality to be therefore
labelled "criminal"?
The Supreme Court in its process of selective incorporation has made it
clear that such procedural incorporation has not been undertaken for purposes
of transforming the juvenile hearing into a juvenile criminal court. The imposi-
tion of certain aspects of criminal procedure was initiated to provide safeguards
which would insure fair treatment of the juvenile.29 Since of necessity the juve-
nile offender proceeding has similarities to the criminal trial, the transposition
of certain criminal safeguards to insure fair treatment is only natural. To infer
that this incorporation necessarily results in an alienation from the basic juvenile
court philosophy of parens patriae would be erroneous. Safeguards to insure
fair treatment and to protect against arbitrariness need not, in any sense, affect
the state in its assertion of parental power, but should reinforce it.
That the juvenile court system is able to remain aligned with its treatment
orientation is reflected in the juvenile court's dispositional power which appears
to be the crux of the entire system. Unlike the criminal court that must set the
sentence within statutorily set limits provided for each criminal offense, the
juvenile court is vested with broad dispositional power. No one set penalty is
specified for a delinquent act, but under the parens patriae concept, it is left
to the discretion of the court as to what disposition will best serve the interests
and welfare of the child.3" Broad dispositional power is both justified and neces-
sitated in a system whose prime interest is the welfare of the minor.
The degree of discretion varies among the states; most legislatures impose
certain limitations on the court's dispositional power. A Missouri statute specif-
ically limits commitment of a delinquent to an institution authorized or licensed
by the state to care for children,"' statutorily ruling out penal commitment. Other
state statutes ostensibly import similar limitations yet careful scrutiny of the
statutory language and references results in different dispositional powers. In
Nebraska upon adjudication of delinquency, one possible alternative is to commit
the child to the care and custody of the Department of Public Institutions. 2
cert. denied, 374 U.S. 851 (1963).
24 Dendy v. Wilson, 142 Tex. 460, 179 S.W.2d 269 (1944).
25 Moquin v. State, 216 Md. 524, 140 A.2d 914 (1958); State v. R.E.F., 251 So.2d 672
(Fla. App. 1971). Contra, M. v. Superior Court of Shasta County, 4 Cal. 3d 370, 482 P.2d
664 (1971).
26 State v. Fisher, 17 Ohio App. 2d 183, 245 N.E.2d 358 (1969).
27 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
28 See generally, Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 1128 (1955).
29 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971).
30 See, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 211.181 (1959).
31 Id. at §§ 211.181 (2) (a), '(2) (b).
32 Nn-. Rav. STAT. § 43-210(2) (1968).
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One of the facilities that is statutorily included within the Department of Public
Institutions is the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex." Hence, the
youth may be indirectly committed to a penal institution through the agency
of the Department of Public Institutions. New Jersey's statute is similarly vague.
That statute allows commitment to a public institution established for the care,
custody, instruction, and reform of the juvenile offender, or "to any like institu-
tion" to which commitment is authorized by law."' "Any like institution" must
necessarily encompass all facilities other than those designed specifically for the
juvenile offender, and consequently, must include penal facilities in that no
statute specifically disallows the penal incarceration of the juvenile. A few states
have specifically removed practically all limits to the dispositional discretion of
the juvenile court. Maine, for example, statutorily authorizes a full span of dis-
positional alternatives including direct commitment to the men's or women's
correctional facility."
This is indeed the problem whether the recognition of flexibility validly
implies the need to extend this dispositional discretion to the extreme bounds of
penal incarceration.
III. Litigation
A. Cases Invalidating Penal Commitment
Decisions that refuse to sustain the commitment of juvenile offenders to
penal institutions have generally placed emphasis both on the unique purpose
of the juvenile court and on the distinct difference in modes of confinement
between juvenile and penal facilities.
A number of state courts have held that by penally incarcerating juvenile
offenders, juvenile courts have overstepped the scope of their authority by failing
to meet their responsibility to protect the interests of the juvenile. State u. Fisher,"
decided by an Ohio appellate court, invalidated the penal incarceration of a
juvenile offender less upon basic juvenile court philosophy than straight deductive
logic. Acknowledging that a denial of liberty without due process of law is de-
pendent upon the type of restraint imposed,3 7 the court invalidated the penal
commitment because the juvenile court is statutorily authorized only to adjudi-
cate the status of a child in a civil proceeding, not to convict the juvenile
33 Id. at § 83-107.01 (1971).
34 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 4-37(b) (Supp. 1972).
35 Ma. Iv. STAT. Aim., tit. 15, § 2611-4(A-1) (Supp. 1972), See, State v. Huard, 296
A.2d 141 (Me. 1972), where the Supreme Court of Maine refused to rule on the constitu-
tionality of this statutory provision.
36 17 Ohio App. 2d 183. 245 N.E.2d 358 (1969). But see also, In re Baker, 18 Ohio App.
2d 183, 248 N.E.2d 620 (1969), which involved an appeal from an adjudication of delinquency
and the subsequent penal incarceration of an 18-year-old, who under Ohio law could have been
proceeded against as an adult. The court sustained the commitment, asserting that by statute
an 18-year-old could not have been committed to any other institution, and it was not for the
court to prescribe the place of treatment in light of this statutory provision. The court did
not feel that petitioner's constitutional rights had been infringed since the juvenile proceeding
had afforded him a fair forum in which to defend himself.
37 Id. at 191, 245 N.E.2d at 363.
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offender. 8 By inference, the court's conclusion is based on the assumption that
a valid distinction exists between confinement in an adult offender facility and
a juvenile offender facility and that this distinction is sufficient to indicate a
denial of due process. 9
A similar assumption was made by the Vermont Supreme Court in In re
Rich .4  Reemphasizing that a juvenile hearing is a noncriminal custody proceed-
ing, the court asserted that confinement in a penal institution is not by nature
protective but is in fact punitive, and punitive commitment will necessarily
convert the proceedings from informal to criminal.4
The court in White v. Reid 2 refused to merely assume substance to the
"protective-penal" labels relied on by Fisher and Rich, preferring to explore the
distinction between juvenile and penal facilities within a more objective context.
In order to insure fair treatment in the absence of the criminal procedural frame-
work, the court in White recognized the judicial duty to initially inquire whether
"the state is presently exercising a reasonable restraint as guardian in loco parentis,
or whether petitioner is being confined as punishment for an offense."4 Placing
this inquiry in proper perspective, the court further emphasized that although
modem penal institutions may often resemble juvenile facilities, the two are
objectively distinct:
It is true that in both juvenile court and criminal proceedings a person
may be deprived of his liberty. It is likewise true in the modern adminis-
tration of penal institutions increasing emphasis has wisely been placed upon
the rehabilitation and training of prisoners as essential elements in a pro-
gram for crime prevention and correction. Therefore some of the features
of penal institutions resemble those of educational, industrial and training
schools for juvenile delinquents. The basic function and purpose of penal
institutions, however, is punishment as a deterrent to crime. However
broad the different methods of discipline, care and treatment that are
appropriate for individual prisoners according to age, character, mental
condition, and the like, there is a fundamental legal and practical difference
in purpose and technique. Unless the institution is one whose primary con-
cern is the individual's moral and physical well-being, unless its facilities
are intended for and adapted to guidance, care, education and training
rather than punishment, unless its supervision is that of guardian, not that
of a prison guard or jailor, it seems clear a commitment to such institution
is by reason of conviction of crime .... 4
This distinction between juvenile and penal institutions is as relevant today
as when it was made twenty years ago. A major distinction in purpose must be
38 Id. at 189, 245 N.E.2d at 362, where the court noted that "[p]roceedings in the Juvenile
Court are civil in nature and not criminal. Section 2151.35, Revised Code, implies protection
for the minor and not punishment."
39 In the face of such logical statutory deduction, it seems difficult to conceptualize any
opposing argument. Yet many courts are intent upon allowing penal commitment and attempt
to circumvent logic with various arguments.
40 125 Vt. 373, 216 A.2d 266 (1966). See also, State v. Adams, 143 W.Va. 325, 102
S.E.2d 145 (1958), where the West Virginia Supreme Court invalidated penal commitment of
its juvenile offenders using almost identical reasoning.
41 125 Vt. at 378, 216 A.2d at 269.
42 125 F. Supp. 647 (D.D.C. 1954).
43 Id.
44 Id. at 650.
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recognized in light of the fact that the convicted adult offender is at the cor-
rectional facility because he is "deemed to be in possession of his normal mental
faculties and is held morally and criminally responsible for the conduct which
brought him there... ." The juvenile offender is the subject of a commitment
under a completely different focus. His commitment is "directed at a condition,
disability, or 'status' of the person... and assumes an absence, or at least a
more limited degree, of free choice and hence of moral and criminal responsi-
bility."' A commitment under this focus must therefore be distinct from a crim-
inal sanction.
If juvenile courts cannot penally incarcerate the more incorrigible juvenile
offender, what alternatives are left for those charged with the problem of rehabil-
itation? United States u. Hegstrom7 specifically met this practical issue. It
was the court's opinion that if the juvenile is rn-suited for the existing juvenile
facility then he is also rn-suited for the juvenile court system. This determination
should be made at the outset and the ill-sulted juvenile should be waived to adult
criminal court. To try and sentence the youth as a criminal offender from the
start would at least afford the juvenile the entire array of constitutional safe-
guards."8
Probably the better alternative, and one that meets both the humanitarian
needs and the constitutional issues, was offered by the court in Kautter v. Reid.49
With regard to the juvenile who presumably would not fit the mold of the exist-
ing juvenile institution, new and more suitable institutions provide the ultimate
answer.50
Under either alternative an option is present to treat the minor as a juvenile
offender or to initiate criminal proceedings. Once that option is exercised and
the state decides to bring the youth under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court,
no penal commitment can be sustained. If the state decides to hold the minor
criminally responsible, as evidenced by a subsequent penal incarceration, the
juvenile is entitled to all the constitutional safeguards afforded a defendant at a
criminal proceeding.
B. Cases Sustaining Penal Commitment
There have been a variety of arguments validating the penal incarceration
of juvenile offenders. Often these arguments are outrageously transparent and
reflect little analytical reasoning. In Ex parte Buchfield,51 for example, the penal
incarceration of a fifteen-year-old girl was upheld on the grounds that commit-
ment to an adult penal institution could not be deemed "punitive" since any
commitment by a juvenile court is statutorily designated as protection and treat-
ment, not punishment.5 2 Obviously, labels are being manipulated in order to
45 Pirsig, supra note 3, at 133.
46 Id.
47 178 F. Supp. 17 (D. Conn. 1959).
48 Id. at 18.
49 183 F. Supp. 352 (D.D.C. 1960).
50 Id. at 355.
51 90 Okla. Crim. App. 197, 212 P.2d 145 (1949).
52 Id. at 199, 212 P.2d at 147.
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produce the desired result. For the most part, however, the cases upholding the
penal incarceration of juvenile offenders have attempted to qualify this disposi-
tion by more substantial justification, most of which seems to emphasize the
urgency of the circumstances.
1. Practical Necessity
It takes neither a legal scholar nor a penologist to recognize that certain
juvenile offenders are inappropriate for the type of environment offered at pres-
ently existing juvenile facilities. Penal incarceration of a juvenile offender was
sustained in Stone u. State53 because in the specific circumstances more stringent
discipline was needed than that available in juvenile facilities. The stricter
environment of the penal institution was prompted and justified by the unruliness
of the juvenile. Similarly the court in Wilson U. Coughlin54 concluded that "the
severity of the restraint is governed entirely by the actions of the child resisting
parental authority."55 The juvenile offender himself forced the hand of the
authorities and had to suffer the consequences.
The practical need for dispositional flexibility formed the basis upon which
a series of cases arising under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act56 sought
to justify penal incarceration. Under the Delinquency Act federal jurisdiction
commences upon consent by the juvenile, and if adjudged delinquent, the juve-
nile is committed to the custody of the Attorney General.5 The Attorney General
has broad discretion as to the institution of custodial confinement and at times
commitment has been to penal facilities. A federal district court in Suarez v.
Wilkinson8 recognized that under the Act juveniles should normally be saved
from the stigma of criminality in that "persons under the age of eighteen do not
have mature judgment and may not fully realize the nature or consequences of
their acts."59 The court emphatically noted, however, that the right to this pro-
tective treatment was not absolute but was always subject to the discretionary
power of the Attorney General.6" The court in Arkadiete v,. Markley1 refused
to inquire into the extent of this discretionary power because the nature of the
custody must be left to those in charge of the problem of rehabilitation.6" And
in Sonneburg v. Markley 3 it was noted that even federal penitentiaries are
equipped with facilities to meet the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile court
system."
Suarez, Arkadiele, and Sonneburg validly recognize the need for flexibility
in regard to mode of treatment. What these and other cases have failed to note,
53 237 A.2d 412 (Me. 1968).
54 259 Iowa 1163, 147 N.W.2d 175 (1966).
55 Id. at 179-80.
56 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031 et seq. (1970).
57 18 U.S.C. § 5034'(1970).
58 133 F. Supp. 38 (M.D. Pa. 1955).
59 Id. at 39.
60 Id. at 39-40.
61 186 F. Supp. 586 (S.D. Ind. 1960).
62 Id. at 587.
63 289 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1961).
64 Id. at 129.
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however, is that despite its beneficial effect, discretion is often abused. When
the authorities opt to bring the offender through the juvenile proceeding, the
juvenile acquires a right to receive its fruits, and the inadequacy of sufficient
juvenile facilities to treat the more troubled youth cannot operate to justify
punitive measures against this juvenile.
2. The Murray Case-Misinterpreting the Scope of McKeiver
By far the most influential decision supporting the penal incarceration of
juvenile offenders is the recently decided second circuit case United States
ex rel. Murray v. Owens.0 5 The fifteen-year-old petitioner was found delinquent
by a New York family court and was subsequently committed to a penal in-
stitution. Petitioner argued a denial of due process and equal protection in
that he received a criminal sentence upon the termination of an informal, non-
criminal proceeding. Judge Gurfein of the district court"' sustained the argu-
ment holding this combination of procedure and disposition unconstitutional
as a violation of due process.
On appeal the second circuit reversed the decision by the district court and
reinstated petitioner's commitment. Their decision was based on the United
States Supreme Court's analysis in McKeiver v. PennsyluaniaY Pertaining to
the need for jury trials at juvenile hearings, McKeiver once again established
that the juvenile court must meet the due process standard of fundamental
fairness. Using this standard it was concluded that jury trials would enhance
rather than alleviate the shortcomings of the juvenile court system. This bur-
densome procedure would not substantially aid the fact-finding function of the
court and might well jeopardize the juvenile court's emphasis on informality
and rehabilitation by its tendency toward formality and adversariness.
The second circuit apparently saw petitioner's argument as essentially iden-
tical with the issue decided by McKeiver-whether as a result of the distinct
possibility of penal incarceration the juvenile is constitutionally entitled to a jury
trial at the juvenile hearing. The court reiterated the negative response given
by McKeiver, holding that:
[Tihe conclusion is inescapable that the Supreme Court in no way implied
that jury trials were constitutionally required if the ultimate disposition
following an adjudication of delinquency was the same as for older offenders.
The Court's determination that trial by jury would not effectively improve
the fact-finding process during the adjudicatory stage is not altered by
whether the juvenile once adjudged a delinquent is committed to a juvenile
or adult facility. The advantages sought by the juvenile system do not
begin and end with the treatment considered appropriate once an adjudi-
cation of delinquency has been reached: they include "the idealistic prospect
of an intimate, informal protective proceeding" . . . , one which disposes
of the issues promptly and without all the time-consuming procedures...
65 465 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1117 (1973).
66 341 F. Supp. 722 (S.I.N.Y. 1972).
67 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
68 465 F.2d at 292.
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In so framing the argument the court cleverly manages to evade the issue
hit so hard at the district court level: is this combination of juvenile procedure
and criminal disposition violative of due process? The second circuit is probably
correct when it says that McKeiver in no way intimated that jury trials were
constitutionally required even when the ultimate disposition was penal incar-
ceration. The entire focus of McKeiver was on retaining the goals of the juvenile
system, and jury trials would add a further unwarranted aspect of criminality.
McKeiver's reference to the penal incarceration of juvenile offenders was for
the sole purpose of pointing up shortcomings of the juvenile system, none of
which would be relieved by jury trials. The Murray court is wrong in thinking
that these references were meant to add to the scope of the decision, and by
failing to meet the issue head-on, the Murray court stumbled past the opportunity
to add a note of finality to this continuing controversy.
IV. Conclusion
The cases that have considered the issue of penal incarceration of juvenile
offenders seem to fit into one of two categories. The first group, those invali-
dating penal commitment, follow the theoretical justifications found in the juvenile
court legislation. In examining the issue in light of the legislative and philosophi-
cal framework, the invalidation of penal commitment is but a logical deduction.
The entire emphasis of juvenile court legislation is on treatment rather than
punishment. A juvenile court has no authority to deal with the juvenile as a
criminal, and thus, penal commitment under the procedures of the juvenile
court can never be sustained.
The second group of cases, those allowing penal commitment, have at-
tempted to overcome the theoretical framework in light of the practical needs
of society. Juvenile crime is upon us in epidemic proportions, with the public
constantly crying for vindication. The inclination to look upon the juvenile
offender as distinct from the criminal offender, requiring sympathetic treatment,
becomes increasingly difficult to maintain. When faced with a particularly
problem juvenile, the juvenile court ultimately finds penal incarceration as the
only viable alternative.
That the lofty ideals sought to be achieved by the juvenile courts have met
only limited success is all too apparent. However, the decision to discard this
unique orientation does not rest with the courts. Until the various legislatures
decide to shelve the traditional juvenile court approach, the system will remain
with us. Clearly an examination of the juvenile court system reveals that the
juvenile court is designed to focus on the juvenile as a person who, because of
age, lacks the capacity and responsibility of an adult criminal offender. It is
incumbent upon the system, therefore, to maintain this focus beyond the adjudi-
catory stage. To first treat the juvenile as lacking adult criminal capacity and
to thereafter incarcerate him in an adult penal institution is a blatant violation
of the juvenile's right to due process of law.
Warren I. Casey
[April 19743
